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Three experiments investigated the relationship between the presumption of harm in harm free 
violations of creatural norms (taboos) and the moral emotions of anger and disgust. In 
Experiment 1, participants made a presumption of harm to others from taboo violations, even 
in conditions described as harmless and not involving other people; this presumption was 
predicted by anger and not disgust. Experiment 2 manipulated taboo violation and included 
a cognitive load task to clarify the post hoc nature of presumption of harm. Experiment 3 was 
similar but more accurately measured presumed harm. In Experiments 2 and 3, only without 
load was symbolic harm presumed, indicating its post hoc function to justify moral anger, 
which was not affected by load. In general, manipulations of harmfulness to others predicted 
moral anger better than moral disgust, whereas manipulations of taboo predicted disgust better. 
The presumption of harm was found on measures of symbolic rather than actual harm when a 
choice existed. These studies clarify understanding of the relationship between emotions and 
their justification when people consider victimless, offensive acts. 
KEYWORDS:anger, disgust, moral emotions, presumption of harm 
 
In Western society today, a common liberal standard of 
tolerable behavior is rights based: People can do as they please, 
as long as they do not violate other people’s rights (e.g., of 
consent) by doing so. But in 2003, this standard was put to a 
severe test by the German court case of Armin Meiwes, a 
cannibal who apparently only sought out willing victims. Meiwes 
had found one such individual through the Internet, Bernd 
Brandes, who after videotaping his consent to the act, was 
dismembered, cooked and partially eaten by Meiwes. The initial 
lesser sentence of manslaughter eventually imposed by the court 
reflected the finding that the act was consensual. According to 
the judge in the case, “(t)here was an agreement between them. 
This was the killing of a person without murder” (Harding, 
2004). Many commentators, however, found it paradoxical that 
such an act should still appear to meet the rights- and consent-
based standards of liberal morality. One piece was subtitled “If 
everything is permissible between consenting adults, why not?” 
and went on to comment that “(t)he case is a reductio ad 
absurdum of the philosophy according to which individual desire 
is the only thing that counts in deciding what is permissible in 
society” (Dalrymple, 2004). Although the Meiwes case may be 
bizarre, it nonetheless touches on a basic ambivalence that 
troubles advocates of a purely rights-based morality: that this 
moral code may condone behavior that one personally finds 
extremely repugnant. 
Beyond this extreme example, Western society shows a 
general tendency to disapprove of actions that violate taboos 
about sexuality or other uses of the body, even in cases in which 
the action is consensual, private, and has no negative 
consequences for other people. For example, in April 2003, then-
U.S. Senator Rick Santorum commented on the Supreme Court’s 
deliberations that would eventually strike down the Texas law 
against sodomy: “If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to 
consensual sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you 
have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the 
right to adultery”. (Santorum, as quoted in Cooperman, 2003, p. A4) 
This line of argument draws a parallel between the debatably 
immoral behavior of consensual homosexual relations and taboo 
actions toward which there exists a greater consensus of 
disapproval, including incest and (later on in the same 
interview) bestiality. 
We use the term taboo here in reference to norms whose 
violation can be expected to provoke inflexible, disgust-related 
responses and, in particular, norms related to the body, food, and 
sexuality. This follows from research identifying such norm 
violation as a key elicitor of disgust (Haidt, McCauley, &Rozin, 
1994). Research also provides numerous examples that such 
responses are fairly inflexible, at least in the short term; for 
example, a sweater worn by someone who had died of cancer is 
repugnant, even to educated people who know that cancer is not 
contagious (Rozin, Millman, &Nemeroff, 1986); prejudice 
against a person with a disability—even one sustained from an 
injury—is intensified by concerns about contagious disease 
(Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003); and a bonbon shaped like dog 
feces is disgusting, although its only fault is an unfortunate 
resemblance (Haidt et al., 1994). 
Research based on moral judgments has coined the 
term moral dumbfounding(Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), which 
describes the reactions of many participants when being 
interviewed about harmfree scenarios that violate a strongly held 
taboo norm, such as a consensual, private, one-time act of incest 
between a brother and sister using contraception (Haidt, 
Björklund& Murphy, 2000; Haidt&Hersh, 2001). In contrast to a 
non-taboo-violating situation such as the classic Heinz 
dilemma(Kohlberg, 1981), interviewees immediately expressed 
disapproval of the act but were less fluent in justifying their 
disapproval with reasons. These participants sometimes gave 
reasons why the action might be harmful, but these reasons 
contradicted the details of the story: for example, mentioning that 
the incest might lead to deformed offspring even though two 
methods of contraception were described, or mentioning that 
their family might be offended even though the incest was 
described as completely secret. These reasons tended to be 
retracted after the interviewer pointed out their implausibility, but 
participants nonetheless condemned the action. The moral 
dumbfounding effect, then, suggests some degree of ambivalence 
between condoning an action because it is consensual and private 
and condemning it because it violates taboo norms. This 
ambivalence occurs even when the action is described as 
completely harmless. 
One way of resolving the ambivalence aroused by the moral 
dumbfounding effect, as these studies show, is to infer 
or presume some degree of harm to other people, even in cases in 
which no harm is present. The presumption of harm makes the 
condemnation of harmless actions easier by insisting that, in 
some way, harm to other people occurs in such an action. For 
example, research on moral judgmentshas shown that violations 
of sexual norms (e.g., homosexuality) are perceived by some 
participants as harmful to other people, even when they are 
described as private and consensual (Haidt&Hersh, 2001). In 
those studies, the presumption of harm shared most of its 
variance with emotional reactions to the act. However, the 
studies did not attempt to establish which reaction came first, nor 
did they investigate the role of specific moral emotions of 
condemnation such as anger and disgust. 
Anger and Disgust as Moral Emotions  
Anger and disgust have been investigated chiefly as separate 
emotions, experienced in situations that directly affect the 
individual feeling them (Berkowitz, 1999;Roseman & Smith, 
2001; Scherer, 1999), but they have also been studied as moral 
emotions that can respond to violations of norms endorsed by a 
group or society (e.g., Tangney, Stuewig, &Mashek, 2007). 
Together with contempt, they are considered part of the “other-
condemning” family of emotions (Haidt, 2003) that are used to 
express different types of disapproval for the actions of other 
people. 
One idea specific to moral emotions, the CAD triad 
hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, &Haidt, 1999), argues that 
moral anger, as opposed to disgust or contempt, is elicited 
specifically by the perception of harm to others, including 
symbolic harm such as violation of rights. The CAD triad 
hypothesis draws a correspondence between the emotions of 
contempt, anger, and disgust, and three types of moral violation 
with the same initials: community, autonomy, and divinity 
(Shweder, Munch, Mahaptra, & Park, 1997). In this research, 
participants gave their reactions to acts that violated “ethics of 
divinity” (violations of the concept of purity, eating behavior, 
and the sanctity of the body, similar to the aforementioned taboo 
norms), “ethics of autonomy” (violations of the rights of others, 
including harmful acts), or “ethics of community” (public 
violations of group norms). Results showed that divinity 
violations principally evoked disgust, autonomy violations 
evoked anger, and community violations evoked contempt. These 
results were similar when participants used emotion words and 
when they endorsed facial expressions of these emotions. 
One limitation of these studies, however, is that they 
manipulated different moral norms holistically by using various 
scenarios that were later rated to primarily evoke those norms. 
The exact question of what features of those autonomy ethics 
violations evoked anger, and what features of divinity ethics 
violations evoked disgust, remained unclear. This question is 
especially relevant to scenarios creating a presumption of harm, 
because such a presumption implies that the act is seen to violate 
autonomy ethics although it is only described as violating 
divinity ethics. If the presumption of harm to others is made 
toward a violation of divinity ethics, then would anger 
accompany it? The data reported in Rozin et al. (1999) cannot tell 
us this; they reported only the most frequent category of emotion 
for each scenario and did not measure the extent to which harm 
to others was inferred by the same participants who rated anger 
and disgust. 
The first aim in our present research, then, was to carry out a 
more rigorous test of the CAD hypothesis, manipulating the 
presence or absence of harm to others in comparable scenarios 
and measuring the degree of anger and disgust separately. The 
manipulation of harm to others should affect anger to a greater 
degree than disgust when the two are measured simultaneously. 
Similarly, a manipulation of the presence or absence of taboo 
violations involving the body should affect disgust to a greater 
degree than anger. These findings would more definitively 
establish thatmoral anger, in particular, responds to harm to 
others. This is a more specific prediction than given by the 
preponderance of appraisal models, which, in describing anger 
more generally, most consistently implicate other-agency and a 
negative outcome (e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Weiner, 
1986). 
The simultaneous measurement of anger and disgust also 
responds to the concerns raised by Nabi (2002), who found that 
when participants were asked to described a situation that made 
them feel “disgusted,” they often described episodes more akin to 
anger. These results, and those of Russell and Fehr (1994) in 
which participants gave “disgusted” as a synonym for anger, 
show the need to examine the separate contributions of these 
emotion terms statistically and, ultimately, to use non-language-
based means of measuring them. Other studies providing support 
for the concept of noncreatural moral disgust have likewise 
depended only on the worddisgust and its close synonyms 
(Marzillier& Davey, 2004), rather than on facial expressions and 
words as Rozin and colleagues did (1999). It is thus important to 
study disgust separately from anger through a variety of methods. 
The Nature of the Presumption of Harm  
The second concern in this research deals with how, when, 
and why the presumption of harm is made. As previously 
mentioned, Haidt and Hersh (2001)showed that some of their 
participants reacted to descriptions of unconventional sexual 
practices with a presumption of harm. Moreover, these results 
showed thatmoral judgment was not predicted by harm-based 
reasons independent of affectivereactions. They concluded that 
arguments about harm were a post hoc attempt to justify initial 
emotion-based negative moral judgments. However, their results 
do not prove that the presumption of harm was post hoc, because 
they are also consistent with a model in which affective reactions 
fully mediate between an a priori judgment of harm and a moral 
disapproval outcome (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). It is 
therefore desirable to demonstrate more conclusively that 
arguments about harm to others, in a case where none is 
described, represent a post hoc justification of affect and—
specifically because of the correspondence between anger and 
harm—a justification of anger and not disgust. 
Research on anger has focused mainly on investigating the 
emotion as a personal reaction toward specific stimuli affecting 
the individual, as opposed to the research on moral anger 
described earlier. Previous research on personal anger has 
revealed that—in a very simple manner—it is a reaction 
associated to a negative event that can be attributed to an external 
agency, while the person has the resources to confront the event 
(Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 
1996; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner, 1986). Research 
has also revealed that anger can additionally respond to a larger 
set of appraisals, elicitors, and conditions, such as goal obstacle, 
control, and unfairness (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De 
Boeck, 2003). However, Kuppens et al. (2003) found that none of 
the single appraisals studied were necessary or sufficient to elicit 
anger, suggesting that the elicitors of anger are complex and 
possibly dependent on the situation or individual. 
Anger can also become associated with a social group or 
action independent of any appraisal of the situation, as part of 
an affective attitude. In a recent study, for example, Tapias, 
Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez, and Wickens (2007, Study 3), primed 
social groups stereotypically associated either with anger 
(African Americans) or disgust (gay men) and showed 
corresponding effects on measures of emotions. Considering that 
most discussions of taboo subjects such as incest or cannibalism 
involve examples where someone really is unjustly harmed, 
leading to anger, it is not surprising that anger should be 
associated with these taboo violations even when they are 
presented as absolutely harmfree. We propose that the 
presumption of harm, then, is a post hoc elaboration made to 
justify anger that initially arises either from previous associations 
to the act or from the simple consideration that another person is 
responsible for a negative act. If moral anger usually arises from 
a situation in which someone is harmed or rights are violated, it 
is reasonable that, when justifying anger in a moral situation 
lacking these features, its characteristic appraisals will be 
invoked. With sufficient cognitive resources, this anger becomes 
moralized, introducing an elaborated appraisal element of harm 
to others that is more suitable to moral than personal anger. 
Our model is consistent with the social intuitionist model 
(Haidt, 2001), in that the presumption of harm to others is one 
example of a post hoc justification of an initial intuitive negative 
reaction based on the taboo violation. The social intuitionist 
model also proposes that the intuitive emotional reaction is fast 
and effortless, compared with the effortful rational justification 
of actions based on their consequences. If this is indeed the case, 
a cognitive constraint should diminish the effortful post hoc 
process, the presumption of harm, while sparing the effortless 
process—in this case, the intuitive emotional reactions. In a 
similar manner, Alicke’s (2000) culpable control model also 
proposes that judgments of harm and responsibility form a 
schema together with negative emotions of blame such as anger, 
in which the presence of each element increases the likelihood 
that the others will be perceived. Empirical support for culpable 
control shows, for example, that when harm is greater, people 
also ascribe more responsibility to the person on 
an aposterioribasis. Focusing more closely on anger, other 
research based on the “intuitive prosecutor” hypothesis has 
shown that unresolved anger at unpunished crimes leads to 
greater inferences of harm in subsequent unrelated cases 
(Goldberg, Lerner, &Tetlock, 1999). Also, in support of the 
social-intuitionist model, other research has shown that 
manipulations of disgust lead to more extreme moral 
judgments(Wheatley &Haidt, 2005). Although these results are 
suggestive, none of these previous models have drawn a 
distinction between anger and disgust as a trigger for the specific 
presumption of harm to others; our model specifically implicates 
anger, as opposed to the closely related emotion of disgust, in 
presumption of harm. 
In summary, we propose that, when a taboo-breaking act 
elicits both anger and disgust, it is anger specifically that can 
create the presumption of harm where none is described by 
completing a schema, motivated or otherwise, in which moral 
anger requires justification through harm to others. When harm is 
described explicitly (seeFigure 1A),there would be no need to 
presume harm, and the taboo-violating nature of an act would not 
affect inferences of harm or anger. Conversely, we predicted that 
in conditions in which no harm to others is described (see Figure 
1B), the presumption of harm is a post hoc process used to justify 
a more intuitive anger reaction. Although we expect a large main 
effect of described harmfulness on perceptions of harm, there 
should also be an interaction: a smaller increase in anger and 
perceptions of harm when no harm is described, if the act 
described violates a taboo (see Figure 1C). In this case, anger 
but not disgust should predict presumption of harm. 
The presumption of harm explored here presents a novel 
alternative for investigating the relationship between harm and 
emotions. Although harm has been identified as one of the 
appraisals preceding the experience of anger, the use of harm as a 
justification for anger, rather than as a reaction, has received less 
attention. Our view of harm as a post hoc, effortful justification 
would be supported by finding a presumption of harm to others 
from a taboo-breaking act when no harm is explicitly described, 
and by the reduction of mean levels of presumption of harm, but 
not of emotions or judgments of moral wrongness, under 
conditions of cognitive constraint. 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model predicting (A) independent contribution of harm to others and taboo violation to anger and disgust reactions; (B) 
when no harm to others is described, presumption of harm from mere taboo violation as a post hoc response; and (C) graphical representation of 
predictions for anger and perceived harm and for disgust. 
Present Research: Overview  
The present research has two main objectives. The first one is 
to clarify the relationship between anger, disgust, and harm 
in moral judgment by manipulating the presence or absence of 
harm to others and taboo violations. Measuring both anger and 
disgust at the same time, rather than offering a forced choice, 
allows us to compare the effects of the manipulations on both 
emotions and to control for any correlation between them. To 
further clarify the difference between these two emotions, we 
included measures of action tendencies shown in previous 
research to be differentially associated with them: attack and 
punishment for anger and avoidance for disgust (Frijda, 
1986; Lazarus, 1991; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). We 
expected that these action tendencies would respond to the 
manipulations of taboo and harm to others as the emotions 
would. 
The second objective is to establish the existence of anger 
and the role of presumption of harm in reactions to taboo actions 
that do not harm other people. The relationship between 
intentionally caused negative outcomes and personal anger has 
previously been established, mostly by appraisal 
theories (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 2001; Roseman& Smith, 
2001). However, these theories did not predict that anger in a 
moral situation specifically responds to harm to others (as 
opposed to negative outcomes in general) or that presumptions of 
harm are made post hoc to justify anger. In research, the specific 
appearance of moral anger toward taboo violations described as 
consensual and private has not yet been shown to accompany 
presumption of harm to others and has not been demonstrated 
through experimental manipulations of different kinds of 
described harm and taboo violations. In the experiments 
presented here, we aimed to address these unknowns. 
In Experiment 1, we manipulated scenarios of different taboo 
violations to contain descriptions of harm to others, harm to the 
perpetrator of the action, and no harm for anyone. The main aims 
in this experiment were to establish the link between harm to 
others and anger, as opposed to disgust, and to see whether 
presumption of harm to others occurred even in conditions in 
which no harm to others was present. 
In Experiment 2, the described harm to others and taboo-
breaking nature of an act were both manipulated orthogonally 
with two main aims. First, we wanted to clarify the effect of each 
independent manipulation on the presumption of harm to others. 
In addition to main effects of manipulated harmfulness on anger, 
and of taboo violation on disgust, an interaction between the 
manipulations of harm and taboo was expected so that more harm 
would be presumed as a result of the taboo action only when no 
harm to others was described (see Figure 1C). The second aim 
was to investigate the post hoc nature of this presumption of 
harm using a cognitive load manipulation. If harm is presumed 
through an effortful post hoc process in order to justify an 
intuitive emotional moral judgment (see Figure 1B), cognitive 
load should eliminate the effect of the taboo violation 
manipulation on mean levels of presumed harm, but not on mean 
levels of reported emotions or moral judgment, when judging a 
scenario described without harmful consequences. In Experiment 
2, we included measures of actual and symbolic harm, expecting 
that the latter would be easier to use as a justification because no 
actual harm was described. 
Experiment 3 was a partial replication of Experiment 2 that 
improved the wording of one of the questions about harm to 
allow direct comparisons between the types of harm described 
and to solve a potential problem with nonequivalence of the 
different harm questions. 
Experiment 1  
In our first experiment, we investigated to what extent angry 
and disgusted reactions to taboo violations are affected by 
different descriptions of harm and to what extent harm to others 
is presumed on the basis of the description of the taboo-violating 
action when no harm to other people is described. The 
experiment contained three different scenarios describing taboo 
violations: one involvingnecrophilia; another one involving 
consensual incest, based on Haidt et al.’s (1993)study; and a third 
scenario involving nonharmful cannibalism (eating a human 
steak grown from a cell culture). We manipulated the extent of 
harm by creating a version of each scenario in which people 
other than the actors were explicitly psychologically harmed, as 
well as a version in which nobody was harmed. A third harm 
condition presented each action as causing psychological harm to 
the actors in the scenario but to nobody else. This condition was 
meant to demonstrate that anger in this situation specifically 
responded to harm to others, rather than just the negative 
outcome of harm in general. 
We predicted the most negative emotional responses and 
judgments of harm to others in the condition in which others 
were harmed. However, we also expected some degree of 
presumption of harm to others in the remaining conditions, even 
when no such harm was described, and expected that this 
presumption would primarily be linked to anger rather than 
disgust. Finally, we predicted that anger and punishment would 
be more strongly influenced by our manipulation of harm to 
others, relative to disgust and avoidance. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-four undergraduate psychology students at the 
University of Kent, United Kingdom, participated in the 
experiment in one of three sessions of a lecture. Seventy-two 
participants were female, and 22 were male. 
Materials 
The questionnaire presented three fictitious stories in which 
the main character or characters violated a different creatural 
taboo or social norm involving the body. The described 
consequences of these actions were manipulated to create three 
different harmfulness conditions. In the no-
consequences condition, there were no described negative 
consequences for anyone. In the harm-self condition, the main 
character of the story was psychologically harmed, but no one 
else was harmed. In the harm-others condition, the main 
character was not harmed, but someone else was harmed 
psychologically (see Appendix 1). Thus, the main independent 
variablewas a three-level within-participants factor. 
The questionnaires were counterbalanced so that each 
participant received one variation (no consequences, harm to the 
self, and harm to others) of each of the three different stories. 
Thus, each participant had one questionnaire consisting of one 
story with no consequences, another different story with the 
harm-self variation, and a third different story with the harm-
others variation. No participants received repeated scenarios or 
repeated variations of any of them. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to read each story and, immediately 
afterward, to indicate whether the action of the main character 
was right or wrong. After this, participants were asked to indicate 
whether the action of the main character was beneficial or 
harmful to himself or herself (harm-self manipulation check) and 
to people other than the main character (harm-other manipulation 
check). Both judgments were made on bipolar scales ranging 
from 1 (much more benefit than harm) to 9 (much more harm 
than benefit). Participants also indicated how much they would 
like to punish, and how much they would like to avoid, the main 
character of each story on bipolar scales ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 9 (very much). After this, participants were asked to 
indicate to what extent each story made them feel the following 
emotions: anger, compassion, depression, disgust, happiness, 
infuriation, outrage, pity, pleasure, repulsion, sadness, 
satisfaction, sickness, sorrow, sympathy, “grossed out,” and 
contempt. These measures used a scale ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 8 (very much). 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
We conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA), using the 
harmfulness manipulation as a three-level within-participant 
factor to examine responses to the harm-others manipulation 
check. This analysis (see Table 1)revealed a significant effect of 
harmfulness, F(2, 186) = 57.24, MSE = 121.53, p < .001; as 
expected, harm-others stories were judged as more harmful to 
others than no-consequences or harm-self stories were. A similar 
analysis on perception of harm to self also revealed a significant 
effect of the manipulation, F(2, 186) = 12.71, MSE= 39.94, p < 
.001; protagonists of the harm-self stories were perceived as 
more harmed than those of the no-consequences and harm-others 
stories. 
 
Table 1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of Harm, Moral 
Judgment, Emotions, and Action Tendencies by Harm Condition, 
Experiment 1 
Moral Judgment 
The effect of harmfulness on participants’ moral judgment of 
the act’s wrongness was significant, F(2, 186) = 19.14, MSE = 
46.03, p < .001. Each level differed significantly from each other; 
the harm-others versions were judged the most wrong; harm-self, 
second most wrong; and no-consequences, least wrong (seeTable 
1). 
Anger and Disgust 
For the index of all three anger items (angry, outraged, and 
infuriated), Cronbach’s α = 0.91; for the index of all four disgust 
items (disgusted, sickened, repulsed, and grossed-out), 
Cronbach’s α = 0.95. Correlations between these indexes were 
computed for each of the three harmfulness conditions and were 
high across all three conditions: no consequences, r(92) = .77; 
harm self, r(92) = .78; harm others, r(92) = .82. In varimax-
rotated principal components factor analyses, when only the 
anger and disgust items were analyzed and the model was 
constrained to produce two factors, all three conditions showed 
the three anger items principally loading on one factor and the 
disgust items on the other. Thus, although anger and disgust were 
closely related, the items also could be reliably differentiated. 
To investigate whether harmfulness influenced relative levels 
of anger versus disgust, we conducted a mixed-model 2 × 3 
ANOVA, with the harm manipulation as a three-level within-
participant factor and anger versus disgust as a two-level within-
participant factor. The main effect of anger versus disgust was 
significant,F(1, 186) = 139.52, MSE = 1.76, p < .001, indicating 
higher overall levels of disgust than anger; harmfulness also had 
a significant main effect, F(2, 186) = 13.22, MSE= 4.87, p < 
.001, indicating more negative affect in harm-others versus no-
consequences conditions. Of greater importance, the interaction 
of harmfulness with anger versus disgust was significant, F(2, 
186) = 8.09, MSE = 0.61, p < .001. The means (see Table 
1) showed that levels of anger, relative to disgust, were more 
influenced by the manipulation of harm to others so that the 
difference between anger and disgust grew smaller in the harm-
others condition relative to the other two conditions. To confirm 
the effect of the harmfulness manipulation on anger, but not on 
disgust—given that the emotions were highly correlated—we 
also conducted a multilevel data analysis (Kenny, Kashy, & 
Bolger, 1998). This revealed that harmfulness influenced anger 
independently of disgust, F(2, 277) = 26.97, MSE= 1.08, p < 
.001. Specifically, harm-others scenarios evoked more anger 
(Madjusted= 4.75, SE = 0.11) than did no-consequences (Madjusted = 
3.83, SE = 0.11) or harm-self (Madjusted = 3.79, SE = 0.11) 
scenarios; both comparisons were significant (p < .001). The 
manipulation did not affect disgust independently of anger, F(2, 
277) = 0.49, MSE = 1.15, ns. 
Presumption of Harm 
The item regarding harm to others was used to test for the 
presumption of harm in the no-consequences and harm-self 
conditions. On the 9-point scale used, the reported harm to others 
in the no-consequences conditions (6.07) was significantly higher 
than the midpoint of the scale (i.e., toward the “harmful” 
side), t(93) = 6.32,p < .001. In the harm-self condition, the 
overall mean (5.99) was also significantly higher than the 
midpoint of the scale, t(93) = 6.20, p < .001. It is important to 
note that these effects were present in each scenario separately. 
We had predicted that harm to others would be associated 
with anger but not with disgust. Anger and disgust were used as 
simultaneous predictors of harm to others for the two conditions 
in which harm to others was presumed rather than described: no 
consequences and harm self. A multilevel data analysis was again 
used, revealing that among the no consequences scenarios, anger 
was associated with perceived harm to others, β = .36, p < .05, 
but disgust was not, β = .04, p = .78. Likewise, among the “harm 
self” stories, anger was associated with perceived harm to others, 
β = .38, p < .05, but disgust was not, β = −.12, p = .44. This 
indicates that when harm to others was not explicitly described, 
anger but not disgust was associated with the presumption of 
harm. 
Action Tendencies 
A 2 × 3 analysis similar to the one used for the emotion items 
was performed on theaction tendencies, substituting the emotions 
for the action tendencies as a within-participants factor. The main 
effect of punishment versus avoidance was significant, F(1, 186) 
= 152.26, MSE = 558.01, p < .001, indicating higher overall 
levels of avoidance than punishment. Harmfulness also had a 
significant main effect,F(2, 186) = 9.20, MSE = 88.67, p < .001, 
indicating more general willingness to take any kind of action in 
harm others versus the other conditions. The expected interaction 
of harmfulness with punishment versus avoidance was also 
significant,F(2, 186) = 5.73, MSE = 11.43, p = .004. The harm 
manipulation increased punishment more so than avoidance, 
leading to a lower difference between the two in the harm others 
conditions (see Table 1). 
We performed regression analyses for the whole sample to 
test our general predictions about the correspondence between 
emotions and action tendencies. These analyses followed the 
multilevel analytic model of the previous section because the 
tendencies of avoidance and punishment were correlated across 
scenarios (r = .64). As expected, only anger (β = .39, p < .001) 
and not disgust (β = −.12, p < .05) positively predicted 
punishment independent of avoidance. Also, disgust (β = .31, p < 
.001) but not anger (β = .07, p = .30) predicted avoidance 
independent of punishment. These findings reinforce the 
expected correspondence between emotions and action 
tendencies and provide another basis for differentiating between 
these two highly correlated emotions. 
Discussion 
Results of this experiment supported our prediction regarding 
presumption of harm. As expected, the highest level of harm to 
others was reported in the harm-others conditions. However, 
harm (vs. benefit) to others was higher than the scalemidpoint in 
the no-consequences and the harm-self conditions, suggesting 
presumption of harm. These presumptions of harm were 
associated with anger but not with disgust, although the two 
emotions were highly correlated in all the conditions. This effect 
was especially clear when the harm was presumed and not 
described. Despite the high correlation between the two 
emotions, in regression analyses, the harm-others manipulation 
affected anger independent of disgust but not vice versa. It is 
important to note that the harm-self manipulation did not have 
this effect, showing that moral anger depends on more than a 
negative outcome. 
Our predictions about action tendencies were also supported. 
Results showed that anger was associated with punishment but 
not avoidance, whereas disgust was associated with avoidance 
but not punishment, when the shared variance between the two 
action tendencies was controlled for. These results in the domain 
of moral emotions further support existing findings on the 
difference in appraisals and action tendencies between these two 
emotions, and they make the distinctions between these emotions 
more clear. 
Despite these findings using regression methods, the 
high correlation between the separate measures of disgust and 
anger still presented a limitation. We thought it probable that the 
use of verbal measures alone was responsible for the high 
correlation, on the basis of the tendency to use words and 
synonyms related to the emotion of disgust as metaphors for 
feelings more akin to the emotion of anger (Nabi, 2002). 
Fortunately, because disgust and anger are considered basic 
emotions, it was also possible to differentiate them on the basis 
of emotional facial expressions. Therefore, measures of these 
emotions using endorsement of both words and facial expressions 
were included in our further experiments. 
Experiment 2  
All the scenarios in Experiment 1 contained elements of 
taboo violation (e.g., inappropriate sexual acts, unusual food, and 
contact with the dead), but only in some conditions were they 
described as harming others. Although results suggested a 
presumption of harm to others in the three stories used, 
Experiment 1 did not include any control conditions in which no 
taboo violations were described. In addition, a clearer 
demonstration of the effect of presumption of harm might be 
expected as a result of manipulating the content of only a single 
story (the “scientist” story from Experiment 1). In order to more 
clearly confirm a presumption of harm based only on taboo 
violation, in Experiment 2 the presence of harm to others and 
taboo violation were manipulated orthogonally, so that their 
independent effects could be assessed. We expected to find a 
greater presumption of harm because of the taboo manipulation 
in the conditions in which harm was not described but equal 
inference of harm in the taboo and non-taboo conditions where 
harm was explicitly described. As in Experiment 1, the 
manipulation of harmfulness to others should affect anger and 
punishment more strongly than disgust and avoidance. In 
addition, we predicted that the manipulation of taboo would 
affect disgust and avoidance more strongly than anger and 
punishment but that it would create a minor increase in anger and 
presumed harm in conditions when there was no actual harm to 
others described—in other words, a Harmfulness × 
Taboointeraction effect (see Figure 1C). 
Another improvement in Experiment 2 is related to 
investigating the nature of presumed harm. As defined by Rozin 
et al. (1999), autonomy ethics state that an action is wrong 
“because it directly hurts another person, or infringes upon his or 
her rights or freedoms as an individual” (p. 575). Results from 
Experiment 1 left unclear whether the presumption of harm 
related to anger was literal or symbolic (e.g., infringing rights). 
This distinction is important because symbolic harm, rather than 
actual harm, would be more plausible in this context to use as a 
justification of a negative reaction, as predicted by the social 
intuitionist model. We therefore added a symbolic harm measure 
of rights violation. 
A third improvement in Experiment 2 was a manipulation 
of cognitive load. Cognitive processing performed with a 
concurrent “load” task, such monitoring text or remembering a 
long number, tends to rely on more automatic and less effortful 
processes, without the benefit of deliberative correction 
(e.g., Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993). Therefore, in our 
model, cognitive load should impair the process of justifying the 
negative intuitive moral judgment but not the judgment itself. We 
should see that in the harmfree conditions, the effect of taboo 
violation on mean levels of presumed harm is high without 
cognitive load but reduced under cognitive load, whereas there is 
no such reduction of emotional or moral disapproval. Moreover, 
because we expect that harm to symbolic entities—in this case 
the rights of other people—will be easier to justify than actual 
harm, it is symbolic rather than actual harm judgments that 
should be reduced by cognitive load in the expected way. 
Finally, a fourth improvement, to reduce the 
high correlation between anger and disgust, was the measurement 
of these emotions through judgments of facial expression images. 
Although the multiple regression techniques we used in 
Experiment 1 address this potential problem by excluding 
variance shared by words of anger and disgust, in Experiment 2, 
we included measures of endorsement of emotional expressions 
to supplement our verbal measures. These expressions were 
similar to those used by Rozin et al. (1999). We expected a 
reduction in the correlation between anger and disgust once 
expression-based measures were included. 
It was expected that these four improvements (the orthogonal 
design of the manipulations, the inclusion of facial expressions of 
emotions, the manipulation ofcognitive load, and the differences 
between symbolic and actual harm) would clarify the role of the 
presumption of harm to others and reveal its post hoc nature. We 
also sought to replicate the relationship between harm and anger 
in conditions in which harm to others was not described but 
rather presumed. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred ninety-four undergraduate psychology students 
from the same university as Experiment 1’s participants (165 
female, 29 male) received partial course credit in return for 
participation. 
Design 
This experiment had a 2 (harmfulness: no harm to others vs. 
harm to others) × 2 (taboo: taboo action vs. non-taboo action) × 2 
(load: load vs. no load) between-participants design. 
Materials 
The questionnaire presented a fictitious scenario that was 
manipulated to create four different variations based on two 
criteria: whether someone other than the main character was 
harmed and whether the action performed by the main character 
broke a taboo (in this case, the one against eating human flesh; 
seeAppendix 2). The scenario was based on the no-harm and 
harm-to-others versions of the “scientist” scenario used in 
Experiment 1. 
All responses were given on 9-point bipolar semantic 
differential scales, unless otherwise indicated. The order in which 
the questions were presented was partially counterbalanced in 
three different forms so that evaluations, harm, and emotions 
each came first for approximately a third of the sample, with the 
other questions following in cyclical order (e.g., emotions first, 
then evaluations, then harm). Action tendencies and 
load manipulation checks, however, always came last. 
Moral disapproval 
The questionnaire contained four moral evaluation items: 
completely right/completely wrong, good/bad, correct/incorrect, 
and positive/negative. 
Harm 
Two questions regarding the perceived level of harm to 
others were included: “Do you think the action of the scientist 
was harmful or beneficial for any other people apart from her?” 
(completely harmful/completely beneficial) and “Do you think 
the action of the scientist violated the rights of any other people 
apart from her?” (not at all/extremely). 
Emotion items 
In the face emotion items, two photographs of female faces 
were shown, one showing disgust in the full form and the other 
showing anger in the open mouth form. The photos were 70 mm 
× 55 mm in black and white and were taken from Rozin et al. 
(1999). Participants were instructed to “select the face that best 
describes your feelings toward the scientist now” and then asked 
to indicate separately how much of each of the feelings 
represented by each face (anger or disgust) they had toward the 
scientist (not at all/extremely). In the verbal emotion items, 
participants were asked to indicated to what extent each story 
made them feel anger, compassion,depression, disgust, 
happiness, infuriation, outrage, pity, pleasure, repulsion, sadness, 
satisfaction, sickness, sorrow, sympathy, grossed out, and 
contempt. These measures used scales ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 8 (very). 
Action tendencies 
Participants then were asked to indicate two action 
tendencies, punishment and avoidance; each one was measured 
with two items. For punishment, the items were “How much 
would you like to punish the scientist?” and “How much would 
you like to publicly condemn the scientist?” For avoidance, they 
were “How much would you like to avoid the scientist?” and 
“How much would you like to move away from the scientist?” 
Load manipulation checks 
At the end of the experiment, participants were requested to 
write down the number they were asked to memorize and to 
answer four 9-point items that measured the extent to which 
being asked to remember the number was irritating, annoying, 
difficult, and distracting (1 = not at all; 9 = extremely). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of between 10 and 25, and 
they did not interact with each other. The experiment was 
introduced as a study to measure how well people could judge 
the actions of someone while they had to remember a number. 
Each group was randomly assigned to one of two cognitive 
load conditions: load or no load. 
At the beginning of the session, the experimenter presented a 
large piece of paper showing a number to the participants for 90 s 
and asked them to remember it for the duration of the 
experiment. A seven-digit number was presented in thecognitive-
load condition, and the numeral 1 was presented in the no-load 
condition. 
After the presentation of the number, participants were given 
a packet of printed materials. They first read the scenario 
corresponding to their experimental condition and then 
completed the response measures as described earlier. 
Results 
Cognitive Load 
Of the 194 participants, 12 reported the load number 
incorrectly, all of them in the load condition. These were 
excluded from the analyses. 
The two items related to the difficulty of the task (if the task 
was difficult and distracting), being correlated at r(180) = .77, 
were averaged to create a single score. A 2 (harmfulness) × 2 
(taboo) × 2 (load) between-participants ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of load, F(1, 174) = 144.50, MSE = 
3.15, p < .001, with no other effects significant, showing that the 
load manipulation increased subjective difficulty. 
The “irritating” and “annoying” items, correlated at r(180) = 
.88, were averaged and subjected to the same ANOVA; only load 
affected this variable, F(1, 174) = 54.30,MSE = 3.92, p < .001, so 
that participants under load reported the number task to be more 
irritating, M = 3.99, SD = 2.39, than participants under no 
load, M = 1.82,SD = 1.46. However, load irritation was not 
significantly related to anger, r(180) = −.08, ns; to disgust, r(180) 
= .00; or to any of the other dependent variablesstudied. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that irritation from load itself influenced 
emotional responses. 
Moral Judgment 
The four moral judgment items formed a reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .90) and so were combined to create one single 
score, in which high numbers meant more judged wrongness. An 
ANOVA on this score showed significant main effects of 
harmfulness, F(1, 174) = 27.50, MSE = 2.19, p < .001, indicating 
more negative evaluation in the harmful condition than in the 
harmless one; and significant main effects of taboo, F(1, 174) = 
8.70, MSE = 2.19, p < .01, showing more negative evaluation for 
the taboo action than for the non-taboo one. A marginally 
significant interaction between these two factors was also 
present, F(1, 174) = 3.76, MSE = 2.19, p = .054. Simple 
effects analysis revealed that only in the harmless condition did 
the type of action affect the evaluation, showing an evaluation of 
the harmless but taboo action (M = 6.39, SD = 1.59) that was 
more negative than when the action was not taboo (M = 
5.29, SD = 1.48); this was in line with the pattern shown 
in Figure 1C. Load did not moderate any of these effects, which 
was consistent with an interpretation of moral judgment as 
relatively intuitive. 
Presumption of Harm 
The items measuring actual harm versus benefit to others and 
symbolic harm (violation of rights) were correlated at r(180) = 
.51, p < .001. An additional within-participant factor of item 
(actual harm vs. symbolic harm) was added to the basic design. 
Overall, there was a main effect of the harmfulness 
manipulation, F(1, 174) = 198.52, MSE = 4.29, p < .001, so that 
it raised judgments both of actual harm and violation of rights. 
There was also a significant Harmfulness × Item interaction,F(1, 
174) = 128.40, MSE = 1.98, p < .001. The effect of the 
harmfulness manipulation increased symbolic harm (difference 
between harmful and not harmfulMs = 4.73) more than it did 
actual harm (difference between Ms = 1.37). Finally, there was a 
significant Harmfulness × Taboo × Item interaction 
corresponding to the predicted presumption of harm effect, F(1, 
174) = 4.04, MSE = 1.98, p < .05.Simple effects analysis of each 
type of harm within each level of harmfulness showed that only 
for symbolic harm was there a significant presumption of harm 
based on the effects of the taboo manipulation, and only in the 
condition in which no harm to others was described, F(1, 174) = 
5.77, p < .05. 
It was expected that cognitive load would moderate the 
presumption of harm. We investigated this prediction by further 
breaking down the previous result by load, which revealed that 
the simple effect of taboo on symbolic harm was significant 
when no harm to others was presented and without cognitive 
load, F(1, 174) = 4.54, p < .05 (see Figure 2),whereas the 
comparable effect under load was not significant, F(1, 174) = 
1.38, p = .23. However, as the overall interaction of harmfulness, 
taboo, and load on symbolic harm was not significant, F(1, 174) 
= .08, MSE = 3.42, p = .78, this result must be interpreted 
cautiously. 
 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 2: Effects of harm, taboo, and load 
manipulations on symbolic harm. Numbers are F(1,178) for simple effect 
of taboo within harm on that dependent variable. mp < .10. *p < 
.05. ns = p > .10.  
Anger and Disgust 
Words for anger (α = 0.89) and disgust (α = 0.95) once again 
formed reliable indices. Anger words correlated more strongly 
with the scaled endorsement of the anger face, r(180) = .38, p < 
.001, than disgust words did, r(180) = .22, p < .01; and the 
difference between dependent correlations was significant, t(179) 
= 2.84, p< .01. Likewise, disgust words were correlated more 
strongly with the disgust face,r(180) = .49, p < .001, than anger 
words did, r(180) = .19, p < .05; this difference was also 
significant, t(179) = 5.78, p < .001. On this basis, two composite 
emotion measures were created, averaging the standardized score 
for each word index with the standardized score for its 
corresponding facial measure. These indices were correlated less 
strongly than the indices in Experiment 1, r(180) = .33,1 so we 
did not feel it necessary to use the other emotion as a covariate. 
A Harmfulness × Taboo × Load ANOVA on anger showed a 
significant main effect of harmfulness, F(1, 174) = 17.81, MSE = 
0.59, p < .001; scenarios described as harmful to others aroused 
greater anger. Taboo did not have a main effect on anger, F(1, 
174) = 2.17, MSE = 0.59, p = .14, but there was a significant 
Harmfulness × Taboo interaction, F(1, 174) = 9.78, MSE = 
0.59, p < .01. Simple effects tests (see Figure 3)indicated that, 
when no harm to others was described, the taboo nature of the act 
increased anger but that there was no such effect in conditions 
describing harm to others. Load had no significant main or 
interactive effects. 
 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 2: Effects of harm and taboo manipulations on 
anger and disgust. Numbers areF(1,178) for simple effect of taboo within 
harm on that dependent variable. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ns = p > .10. 
A similar ANOVA on disgust showed a significant main 
effect of taboo, F(1, 174) = 157.23, MSE = 0.39, p < .001; taboo 
scenarios aroused greater disgust. Harmfulness did not have a 
main effect on disgust, F(1, 174) = 1.56, MSE = 0.39, p = .21; but 
there was a significant Harmfulness × Taboo interaction, F(1, 
174) = 12.37, MSE = 0.39, p < .01. Simple effects tests 
(see Figure 3) indicated that, when both harm and no harm were 
described, taboo increased disgust but that the effect of taboo was 
larger when no harm was described. Again, there were no 
significant main or interactive effects of load on disgust. An 
analysis adding anger versus disgust (emotion) as a within-
participant factor to the basic design confirmed that anger and 
disgust showed different patterns of influence by the 
manipulations of harm to others: Emotion × Harmfulness, F(1, 
174) = 8.54, MSE = 0.34, p < .01; and by taboo violation: 
Emotion × Taboo, F(1, 174) = 63.56, MSE = 0.34, p < .001. 
Taken together, these main and interactive effects confirm our 
predictions for anger and disgust in Figure 1C. 
On the basis of the findings of Experiment 1, it was predicted 
that anger and not disgust would be associated with presumed 
harm to others. As in Experiment 1, focusing on the taboo 
violation/no-harm condition, a regression analysis using anger 
and disgust as predictors of symbolic harm confirmed that anger 
was associated with symbolic harm, β = .46, p < .01, independent 
of disgust, which was not associated with symbolic harm, β = 
−.18, ns. When actual harm versus benefit was used as 
the dependent variable, neither anger nor disgust showed 
significant effects. 
Action Tendencies 
The two punishment items were correlated at r(180) = .68, 
and the two avoidance items were correlated at r(180) = .78, so 
each pair of items was averaged. Because of the 
high correlation between punishment and avoidance (r = .58), 
each one was added as a covariate in the analysis of the other. 
A Harmfulness × Taboo × Load ANOVA on punishment 
showed significant main effects of harmfulness, F(1, 173) = 
8.38, MSE = 2.85, p < .01; and load, F(1, 173) = 9.58, MSE = 
2.85, p < .01; but not taboo, F(1, 173) = 0.01, MSE = 2.85, p = 
.93. As expected, punishment increased when harm was 
described (Msadjusted = 3.54 for no harm and 4.29 for harm). No 
interactions were significant. 
A similar analysis on avoidance revealed significant main 
effects of Taboo, F(1, 173) = 11.53, MSE = 3.55, p < .001; but 
not harmfulness, F(1, 173) = 2.44, MSE = 3.55,p = .12; qualified 
by a significant interaction between them, F(1, 173) = 
9.89, MSE= 3.55, p < .01. The pattern of this interaction showed 
a greater effect of taboo on avoidance when harm was not 
described (no taboo Madjusted = 3.67, tabooMadjusted = 5.72) than 
when it was described (no taboo Madjusted = 5.29, tabooMadjusted = 
5.22). No effects involving load were significant. 
As in Experiment 1, regression analyses confirmed that only 
anger (β = .30, p < .001), and not disgust (β = .00, p = .98), 
predicted punishment independent of avoidance. Conversely, 
disgust (β = .16, p < .05), but not anger (β = .05, p = .48), 
predicted avoidance independent of punishment. 
Discussion 
The independent manipulations of taboo and harm to others 
in Experiment 2 allowed us to further investigate the relationship 
between taboo violations and harm. As in Experiment 1, the 
manipulation of harm to others influenced anger and punishment 
overall as a main effect but did not influence disgust. Likewise, 
the manipulation of taboo violation affected disgust and 
avoidance but not anger. Disgust was also related to 
avoidant action tendencies, whereas anger was related to attack 
action tendencies, drawing a further distinction between these 
two correlated emotions. Moreover, emotional responses were 
not moderated by load, suggesting that they were preserved even 
under cognitive constraint. 
The results further clarified the nature of the harm inferred 
from our manipulations. When participants were able to judge 
symbolic as well as actual harm to others, the manipulation of 
taboo affected symbolic harm to a greater extent than the 
measure assessing harm versus benefit. The presumption of harm 
based on the taboo violation was significant only for the measure 
of rights violation, which in turn was significant only 
without cognitive load, as we predicted. However, the difference 
between load and no-load conditions was not reflected in the 
expected significant interaction. 
As predicted, and replicating the findings of Experiment 1, 
anger was the only emotion associated with presumed harm from 
a taboo violation that does not harm other people. It is important 
to note that anger was associated only with symbolic harm, not 
with actual harm versus benefit, and disgust was not a significant 
predictor of harm. 
Experiment 3 
  
Although Experiment 2 further clarified the presumption of 
harm to others based on a taboo violation, it was expected that 
this effect would be moderated by cognitive load. Indeed, the 
effect was significant under a no-load condition and not under a 
load condition, but the expected higher order interaction did not 
emerge as significant. One limitation is that the measure of actual 
harm was not equivalent to the measure of symbolic harm, 
because the actual harm measure was bipolar, asking for a 
judgment of harm versus benefit. It is plausible to think that the 
benefit associated with the action (e.g., seeing the actions of the 
scientist as a valuable experiment) was involved in judgments of 
the actual harm measure, whereas this complication was not 
present in the symbolic harm measure. 
An improvement would present measures of symbolic and 
actual harm that were worded in exact parallel, so that 
deliberative thought could conclusively reject the implausible 
judgment of actual harm in favor of the more plausible judgment 
of symbolic harm. This improvement would also allow us to 
compare the measures of harm more clearly. To address this 
issue, Experiment 3 partially replicated Experiment 2, focusing 
on the conditions that did not describe harm while retaining the 
factors of taboo and load. The bipolar measure of actual harm 
and benefit was substituted by unipolar measures. We expected 
that, with this procedural change, the findings of Experiment 2 
would be replicated—a presumption of symbolic harm without 
harm to others and only without cognitive load—but that the 
effect of cognitive load would be present not only as a difference 
between simple effects but as a significant interaction that would 
indicate post hoc reasoning. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred nine undergraduate psychology students at the 
University of Kent and the University of Sussex in Brighton, 
United Kingdom, participated in the experiment for partial course 
credit. Of these, 93 were female and 16 were male. 
Design 
The experiment had a 2 (taboo: taboo action vs. no taboo 
action) × 2 (load: no load vs. cognitive load) between-
participants design. 
Materials 
This experiment was presented through a program on a 
personal computer. The measures and procedure were identical to 
those of Experiment 2 except that all participants were in the 
conditions that did not describe harm to others. The questions 
associated with measures of perceived harm were changed: “To 
what extent do you think the action of the scientist was harmful 
to herself?” “To what extent do you think the action of the 
scientist was beneficial to herself?” “To what extent do you think 
the action of the scientist was harmful to anyone else apart from 
the scientist?” “To what extent do you think the action of the 
scientist was beneficial to anyone else apart from the scientist?” 
and “Do you think the action of the scientist violated the rights of 
anyone apart from her?” The analyses will focus on the questions 
about harm rather than benefit, and on harm to others rather than 
self. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of 5 to 20. In each session, 
individual participants were asked to sit in front of one computer 
on which the questionnaire was presented. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions and also to one of 
the two tasks. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Fourteen participants, all in the cognitive-load condition, 
reported the cognitive load number incorrectly and were 
excluded from the analyses, leaving 95 participants. 
Presumption of Harm 
We analyzed the perceived harm to others and symbolic harm 
items using a mixed-model ANOVA with a 2 (harm type: others 
vs. symbolic, within participant) added to the basic design. 
Results showed a significant main effect of harm type, F(1, 91) = 
8.20, MSE = 1.12, p < .01, showing a higher overall perception of 
harm to others (M= 3.41, SD = 2.23) than symbolic harm (M = 
3.00, SD = 2.09). More important, a significant Harm Type × 
Taboo interaction was present, F(1, 91) = 6.31, MSE = 1.12, p < 
.05. As in Experiment 2, simple effects analyses showed that 
perceptions of symbolic harm were higher for the taboo scenario 
(M = 3.45, SD = 2.47) than for the non-taboo scenario (M = 
2.56, SD = 1.53), F(1, 91) = 16.58, p < .001. Moreover, taboo 
had no effect on perceptions of actual harm, F(1, 91) = 0.19, p = 
.67. As expected, this effect was further moderated by a 
significant Harm Type × Taboo × Load interaction, F(1, 91) = 
8.23, MSE = 1.12, p < .01. Simple effects analyses comparing 
actual with symbolic harm showed that under load, the taboo 
manipulation increased symbolic harm, F(1, 91) = 4.43, p < .05; 
although this increase did not occur without load, F(1, 91) = 
1.27, p = .26 (see Figure 4).Therefore, as predicted, only 
symbolic harm was presumed and only under no load. 
 
 
Figure 4. Experiment 3: Effects of taboo and load manipulation on 
perceived actual and symbolic harm. Numbers are F(1, 91) for simple 
effect of taboo. *p < .05. ns = p > .10. 
Moral Judgment 
The four items measuring moral judgment (Cronbach’s α = 
.90) were averaged and analyzed, revealing a significant main 
effect of taboo, F(1, 91) = 8.26, MSE = 2.16,p < .01, indicating 
that the taboo action was evaluated as more wrong (M = 
6.12,SD = 1.34) than the non-taboo action (M = 5.27, SD = 1.57). 
The main effect of load and the interaction between the two 
factors were not significant (all ps> .25). 
Anger and Disgust 
As in Experiment 2, the anger face was more correlated with 
anger words, r(93) = .73, than with disgust words, r(93) = .52; 
and the difference between correlationswas significant, t(92) = 
3.70, p < .001, whereas disgust words were more correlated with 
the disgust face, r(93) = .76, than anger words were, r(93) = 
.54, t(92) = 4.16, p < .001. The same procedure as in Experiment 
2 was used to create one index for each emotion. These indices 
were correlated at r = .64. 
A 2 (Taboo) × 2 (Load) ANOVA on anger revealed a 
marginal main effect of taboo,F(1, 91) = 3.19, MSE = 0.93, p = 
.08; taboo tended to increase mean levels of anger (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 3: Effects of taboo manipulation on anger and 
disgust. Numbers areF(1, 91) for simple effect of taboo. mp < .10. ***p< 
.001. 
A similar analysis on the disgust index revealed a much 
stronger significant main effect of taboo, F(1, 91) = 
56.60, MSE = 0.62, p < .001 (see Figure 5); the taboo condition 
aroused more disgust than the control condition. These results, 
within Experiment 3’s partial design, again confirm the 
predictions of Figure 1C. Finally, adding a within-participant 
factor of emotion (anger vs. disgust) to the design yielded a 
significant Taboo × Emotion interaction confirming that the 
taboo manipulation affected disgust more than anger, F(1, 91) = 
34.50, MSE = 0.25, p < .001. The main effect of load and those of 
the interactions with load were not significant for either emotion 
(all ps> .40). 
As in Experiment 2, we used regression analysis to 
investigate the effect of anger and disgust on the presumption of 
harm. Anger was again associated with perceived symbolic harm, 
β = .64, p < .001; whereas disgust was not, β = −.09, ns. This 
pattern was repeated for actual harm (for anger, β = .57, p < .01; 
and for disgust, β = −.09, ns). Again, moral anger and not disgust 
was associated with the presumption of harm. 
Action Tendencies 
The two items regarding punishment, r(93) = .84, p < .001, 
and the two items regarding avoidance, r(93) = .87, p < .001, 
were each averaged to create one index for each action tendency, 
and these indices were correlated at r = .58. A 2 (taboo) × 2 
(load) ANOVA on punishment controlling for avoidance 
revealed no significantmain effects or interactions (all ps> .36). 
A similar analysis on avoidance showed only a significant main 
effect of Taboo, F(1, 90) = 12.97, MSE = 3.40, p < .001, so that 
avoidance was higher in the taboo condition (Madjusted) = 4.36 than 
in the non-taboo condition (Madjusted = 3.68). Across all conditions, 
anger (β = .47, p < .001) but not disgust (β = .07, p = .53) 
predicted punishment. Only disgust (β = .53, p < .001), but not 
anger (β = .03, p = .77), was a significant predictor of avoidance. 
General Discussion 
  
Presumption of Harm 
Results of these three experiments supported our model 
explaining the presumption of harm to others from a taboo 
violation as a post hoc justification of anger. In Experiment 1, 
taboo-violating scenarios explicitly described as being private 
and consensual nonetheless led to levels of presumed harm to 
others higher than themidpoint of the scale. Although this result 
was suggestive rather than conclusive, Experiments 2 and 3 
confirmed the presumption of harm based on independent 
manipulations of harm to others and taboo violation. In 
conditions in which taboo violation and no harm to others was 
described, participants nonetheless inferred harm to others. This 
inference took the form of violation of rights when such an 
option was offered, plausibly because it was a more defensible 
inference than actual harm to others, under conditions in which 
the act was explicitly described as private and not involving 
others at all. It is important to note that this presumption of harm 
was associated with the emotion anger and not disgust across all 
studies. Our results more systematically confirm previous 
findings in which harm was inferred in connection to a private, 
consensual taboo violation. They establish the presumption of 
harm as a reaction to taboo violations only when harm is not 
explicitly described; establish the presumption of harm as linked 
specifically to anger; and show that, when given the option to do 
so, participants will describe the presumed harm as symbolic 
rather than actual. 
When actual harm was measured separately from benefit in 
Experiment 3, the interaction between harm, cognitive load, and 
taboo violation showed that participants presumed symbolic 
rather than actual harm from a harmless taboo violation without 
cognitive load, whereas under load there was no such tendency. 
Moreover, cognitive load did not moderate the reported levels of 
anger or disgust or the moral judgment of the act as right or 
wrong. These results support our hypothesis regarding the post 
hoc nature of the presumption of harm based on the social 
intuitionist model, in the sense that an immediate and intuitive 
emotional moral response to the taboo violation was later 
justified through the presumption of harm, to the extent that it 
specifically involved anger rather than disgust. When cognitive 
load was present, the presumption of symbolic harm as a form of 
justification was not made. 
Emotions and Action Tendencies 
The moderate to high correlations we found between anger 
and disgust further support their categorization within the family 
of moral emotions (Haidt, 2003). However, these experiments 
provided evidence for distinct antecedents of moral anger and 
moral disgust. The manipulations of harm to others consistently 
affected anger and punishment more than disgust and avoidance. 
Likewise, manipulations of taboo violations affected disgust and 
avoidance to a greater degree than anger and punishment. 
Supporting our explanation of presumption of harm, the 
manipulations of taboo also elicited a certain degree of anger 
when no harm was explicitly described, which was uniquely 
associated with presumed harm to others. 
Despite high correlations between the action tendencies of 
punishment and avoidance, it is important to notice that, across 
our studies, anger predicted the action tendency toward 
punishment independent of disgust. Likewise, disgust predicted 
the action tendency toward avoidance independent of anger. 
Although these relationships can be theoretically predicted, the 
inclusion of measures of action tendencies further clarified the 
distinctions between anger and disgust in conditions wherein 
these emotions were highly correlated. 
Theoretical Implications 
The results presented here remind us not only that emotions 
can be studied as a response toward specific situations or 
appraisals but also that emotions can also have influence on 
appraisals and judgments. In particular, the strong association 
between harm and anger indicates that harm can be seen not only 
an elicitor of anger but also as a response to it, based on the 
disappearance of presumption of harm (but not anger) 
under cognitive load. These findings reinforce the assumptions of 
the social intuitionist model, the “intuitive prosecutor” 
hypothesis, and related ideas (e.g., Lerner &Tiedens, 2006) by 
showing that presumption of harm can be used as an elaborated 
justification to an emotional reaction. These results also give 
empirical support to the post hoc nature of such processes 
previously assumed byHaidt and Hersh (2001) and demonstrated 
by Goldberg et al. (1999) but additionally manipulating the 
nature of the violation to more clearly investigate the roles of 
anger and disgust and the important association of anger with 
harm. 
More specifically, these results extend and clarify the roles of 
anger and disgust as moral emotions as proposed by the CAD 
triad hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1999). The use of independent 
ratings of emotions rather than of forced choices, and the 
manipulation of the contents of similar scenarios rather than the 
comparison of holistically different ones, confirm the assertion 
that moral anger primarily arises from transgressions of the ethics 
of autonomy, including harm and violations of rights. Similarly, 
Experiments 2 and 3 showed that systematically varying the 
extent to which an act constituted a creatural taboo violation 
involving the body (cannibalism) led to increased disgust. 
Although our results mostly support the proposals of the CAD 
hypothesis, it may be premature to limit the emotional response 
of disgust to the ethics of divinity and anger to the ethics of 
autonomy. The discovery of lesser but significant increases in 
anger when a harmless taboo violation was described indicates 
that, although such a scenario may arouse disgust as the 
prevailing response, it also brings up some degree of anger when 
compared with a harmless act that does not involve violating a 
taboo. 
The results presented here raise the question of whether anger 
comes from socially learned associations to a taboo act or from 
basic reactions to it. On one hand, it is plausible to think that 
most cases of cannibalism, for example, are indeed harmful to 
others, so that anger is associated with any thought of eating 
human meat, even if technology renders it innocuous. On the 
other hand, it is also plausible to think that acts such as incest and 
cannibalism are noxious to contemplate, so that a basic nonmoral 
form of anger is evoked in more primitive reactions to these 
stimuli (Berkowitz, 1999). The degree to which these processes 
each contribute to anger toward harmless taboo violations awaits 
future clarification. 
General Implications 
Investigating the differences between anger and disgust is 
important not only in terms of theory but also in practical 
applications to intergroup relations. Although these experiments 
used extreme and even bizarre cases to explore the presumption 
of harm, other results show that homosexuality can elicit an 
equally visceral disgust reaction (Cottrell &Neuberg, 
2005; Haidt&Hersh, 2001). In fact, we used our more arcane 
examples because we wanted to tap into issues in which social 
normsagainst prejudice would not interfere with honest 
expression of emotional reaction and moral judgment. Therefore, 
describing behaviors that are not protected by even the most 
liberal norms of tolerance can possibly shed some light on the 
role of the emotions among those who themselves reject norms of 
tolerance toward gays and other sexual minorities. 
Extending existing results on sexual prejudice, we showed 
that the reactions to taboo violations are not limited to the 
avoidance of the person performing the action but that anger and 
punitive action tendencies can also occur, even in cases when the 
actions are harmless, private, and consensual. These results can 
partially explain some of the hostile reactions toward some 
groups, such as homosexuals, which are based mostly on the 
violations of symbolic values and moral norms and not on actual 
harm to other people. These reactions may be intensified by the 
usual relationship between taboo violations and actual harm. In 
most cases of creatural taboo transgressions, such as cannibalism 
or incest, the result is usually direct harm to others, creating a 
strong association between harm and anger. It is plausible to 
think that this association is present even when there is no harm 
described, so that when anger is evoked, harm is related to it 
(Alicke, 2000). It is not out of the question that similar anger 
reactions could be associated with gay men for a person raised to 
think that homosexuals were especially likely to molest children, 
sexually transmit disease, and spread their lifestyle to unwilling 
others—all beliefs characteristic of antigay attitudes (Herek, 
Widaman, &Capitanio, 2005). 
The distinction between symbolic and actual harm revealed 
that a taboo violation can be perceived as having negative 
consequences for others, even as the result of private and 
consensual actions. Although our research does not directly 
address the extent to which post hoc presumption of harm is a 
motivated process explicitly driven by values, rather than a mere 
byproduct of emotional associations, other research does show 
that violations of sexual morality elicit presumption of harm 
primarily among political conservatives (Haidt&Hersh, 2001). 
This points to an effect that, in some domains, interacts with 
systems of values and morality. Cultural conservatives, for 
example, often claim that opposite-sex marriages are somehow 
harmed by extending marriage rights to same-sex couples, as 
shown by the title of the “Defense of Marriage Act.” Arguments 
such as this, baffling as they may be to supporters of liberal 
standards, make sense to those who believe that respect to 
symbolic entities is more important than the right of individual 
decisions and actions. 
Although our results linked the presumption of harm to anger, 
it is also possible that presumption of harm may sometimes work 
to justify reactions based on disgust. For example, some scholars 
such as Kass (1997) have argued that feelings of repugnance alert 
us to important considerations outside a utilitarian cost-benefit 
analysis, and that while these feelings should be weighed against 
pragmatic concerns, they explain why society does and should 
recoil from practices such as human cloning. Presuming harm 
may also serve important social and motivational functions, 
intensifying sanctions against those who transgress taboo norms 
(Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, 2000) or reacting aggressively against 
reminders of our animal nature (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, et al., 2001; Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, McCoy, et al., 
1999). This post hoc presumption can also be used to 
justify moral judgments based on ideology, political, or religious 
beliefs. For example,Haidt and Hersh (2001) reported that 
conservatives tend to use all three moral codes proposed by the 
CAD triad hypothesis, whereas the moral domain of liberals was 
limited only to the ethics of autonomy. 
Although these results highlight the effect of taboo violations 
on reactions of anger and harm, these experiments did not test the 
possibility that noncreatural actions associated with sociomoral 
disgust—such as racism or cheating—could have similar effects 
or whether noncreatural actions associated with divinity 
violations could have these effects as well. Our examples, as well 
as the divinity ethics violations in Rozin et al.’s (1999) study, all 
involved violation of some bodily norm about food (meat in 
particular), disease, or sexuality. A true test of whether disgust is 
essentially creatural (vs. divinity related) would involve 
violations of purity in aesthetic and religious rather than bodily 
realms. Future research should focus on investigating whether 
sociomoral disgust can arise reliably, as its implications for 
prejudice and racism are important. If some hostile reactions 
toward other groups are based on perceived harm to symbolic 
entities, research on intergroup violence and discrimination can 
benefit from research on moral emotions, as the presumption of 
harm will be associated with anger, and anger with 
punitive action tendencies. 
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Appendix A: Scenarios Used in Experiment 1 
Incest 
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling 
together in France on a summer vacation from college. One night 
they are saying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that 
it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At very 
least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was 
already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, 
just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not 
to do it again. 
No consequences: Julie and Mark have no regrets about that 
night and keep it as a special secret between them, which makes 
then feel even closer to each other. Eventually, they move on and 
are able to form successful long-term committed relationships 
with other people. Nobody ever finds out about what they did on 
their holiday. 
Harm to self: Julie and Mark develop deep regrets about that 
night and keep it as a dark secret, which complicates the 
relationship between them. Eventually, they are unable to form 
successful long-term committed relationships with other people. 
Nobody ever finds out about what they did on their holiday. 
Harm to others: Julie and Mark have no regrets about that 
night and try to keep it as a special secret between them, which 
makes then feel even closer to each other. Eventually, they move 
on and are able to form successful long-term committed 
relationships with other people. However, their family eventually 
finds out and they are very hurt by what Julie and Mark have 
done. 
Necrophilia 
A man belongs to a necrophilia club that has devised a way to 
satisfy the desire to have sex with dead people. Each member 
donates his or her body to the club after death so that the other 
members of the club can have sex with the corpse. The man has 
sex with a dead woman who gave her body to the club. 
No consequences and no harm to self: She had no surviving 
family members. The man and all other members of the club use 
adequate protection so there is no risk of disease being spread. 
After they are done, they cremate the woman’s body, following 
her final instructions to them. 
No consequences: The man and his fellow club members 
have no regrets or mental anguish about what they are doing. 
They understand that it’s important to keep their club a secret and 
they are very successful in making sure nobody in the “outside 
world” finds out about it. Also, they know the limits of the club, 
and they are never tempted to harm living people or engage in 
sex with corpses whose owners did not consent beforehand. 
Harm self: The man and his fellow club members are 
tormented by regret and mental anguish about what they are 
doing. They understand that it’s important to keep their club a 
secret and they are very successful in making sure nobody in the 
“outside world” finds out about it. Also, they know the limits of 
the club, and they are never tempted to harm living people or 
engage in sex with corpses whose owners did not consent 
beforehand. 
Harm others: The man and his fellow club members have no 
regrets or mental anguish about what they are doing. They try to 
keep their club a secret, but the family of the dead woman 
eventually finds out and is deeply hurt. Also, some of the 
members of the club are tempted to break the rules and engage in 
sex with corpses whose owners did not consent beforehand. 
Scientist 
A scientist studying recent advances in 
cell cloning technology takes a group of muscle cells from her 
arm and clones them in a vat. The cells grow into a strip of 
human muscle tissue about the size of a steak. When the process 
is finished, she is curious about the meat’s taste, so she takes the 
strip of tissue and grills it on a barbecue. 
No consequences and harm self: She eats it alone for dinner. 
Harm to others: She gives it to her friends without their 
knowledge. She knows she is free of any communicable diseases. 
No consequences: The scientist does not develop a taste for 
human flesh, and she is never tempted to harm people. Her 
curiosity is satisfied and she goes on with her research. She has 
no regrets or worries about what she has done, as it was all in the 
name of science. 
Harm self: The scientist does not develop a taste for human 
flesh, and she is never tempted to harm people. Her curiosity is 
satisfied and she goes on with her research. However, she 
develops deep regrets about what she has done and worries about 
whether it was worth doing in the name of science. 
Harm others: Their friends did not develop a taste for human 
flesh, and she is never tempted to harm people. Her curiosity is 
satisfied and she goes on with her research. She has no regrets or 
worries about what she has done, as it was all in the name of 
science. Her friends all enjoyed the dinner, but when they find 
out afterwards what it was, they become quite upset and the 
scientist has to apologize to them. 
Appendix B: Scenarios Used in Experiment 2 
  
Non-Taboo-Violating Versions 
A scientist studying recent advances in human memory is 
investigating a new drug that may increase the capabilities of 
human memory. When she finally completes the process, she is 
curious about the effects of the drug, so she mixes the drug with 
water. 
No harm: She drinks it with her dinner to test it on herself. 
No harm to others: She gives it to her friends at a dinner 
without their knowledge to test it on them. She has no reason to 
believe that the drug has negative effects on humans. 
The scientist does not test the drug again, and she was careful 
with the use of the drug. Her curiosity is satisfied and she goes on 
with her research. 
No harm: She has no regrets or worries about what she has 
done, as it was all in the name of science. 
Taboo-Violating Versions 
A scientist studying recent advances in 
cell cloning technology takes a group of muscle cells from her 
arm and clones them in a vat. The cells grow into a strip of 
human muscle tissue about the size of a steak. When the process 
is finished, she is curious about the meat’s taste, so she takes the 
strip of tissue and grills it. 
No harm: She eats it alone for dinner. 
No harm to others: She serves it to her friends for dinner 
without their knowledge. She knows it is free of any 
communicable diseases. 
The scientist does not develop a taste for human flesh, and 
she is never tempted to harm people. Her curiosity is satisfied 
and she goes on with her research. 
No harm: She has no regrets or worries about what she has 
done, as it was all in the name of science. 
Footnotes 
1 Because of this lower correlation, it was not necessary to 
include one emotion as a covariate in analyzing the other 
emotion. In fact, for Studies 2 and 3, analyses covarying out 
disgust from anger and anger from disgust gave results similar to 
the results reported without covariates. 
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